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2013 National Environmental Moot Court
Competition Problem
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________________
NEW UNION WILDLIFE
)
FEDERATION,
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
v.
)
NEW UNION DEPARTMENT OF
)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ) C.A. No. 13-1246
Intervenor-Appellant,
)
v.
)
JIM BOB BOWMAN,
)
Defendant-Appellee,
)
______________________________________)
ORDER
Following the issuance of the Order of the District Court
dated June 1, 2012, in Civ. 149-2012, the New Union Wildlife
Federation (“NUWF” or “Plaintiff”) and the New Union
Department of Environmental Protection (“NUDEP”) each filed a
Notice of Appeal. NUWF takes issue with the decision of the
lower court with respect to its holding: that NUWF lacked
standing to bring a citizen suit against Jim Bob Bowman
(“Bowman” or “Defendant”) pursuant to Clean Water Act (CWA) §
505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006), for a violation of §§ 301(a) and 404
of the CWA, id. §§ 1311(a), 1344; that there is no continuing
violation as required for subject matter jurisdiction under §
505(a) of the CWA, id. § 1365(a); that NUWF’s citizen suit is
barred by NUDEP’s diligent prosecution of Bowman under §
505(b) of the CWA, id. § 1365(b); and that Bowman did not violate
§ 404 of the CWA, id. § 1344, because he did not discharge
dredged or fill material to a water of the United States. NUDEP
takes issue with the decision of the lower court with respect to its
1
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holdings that NUWF did not have standing to bring its citizen
suit and that Bowman did not violate § 404 of the CWA, id. §
1344.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the parties brief all of the
following issues:
1. Whether NUWF has standing to sue Jim Bob Bowman for
violating the CWA. (NUWF and NUDEP argue that
NUWF does have standing and that the court below erred
in granting the Bowman’s motion for summary judgment
on this issue; Bowman argues that NUWF does not have
standing and that the court below was correct in granting
summary judgment on this issue.)
2. Whether there is a continuing or ongoing violation as
required by § 505(a) of the CWA for subject matter
jurisdiction. (NUWF argues that there is a continuing
violation because dredge and fill material is still present
in the former wetlands and that the court below erred in
granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
the issue; Bowman and NUDEP argue that the violations
are wholly past because Bowman ceased his activities on
July 15 and that the court below was correct in granting
summary judgment on this issue.)
3. Whether NUWF’s citizen suit has been barred by
NUDEP’s diligent prosecution of Bowman as set out in §
505(b) of the CWA. (NUWF argues that NUDEP’s actions
do not satisfy the diligent prosecution requirements of §
505 and that the court below erred in granting summary
judgment on this issue; Bowman and NUDEP argue that
NUDEP’s prosecution of and consent decree with
Bowman satisfy the requirements for diligent prosecution
and the court below was correct in granting summary
judgment on this issue.)
4. Whether Bowman violated the CWA when he moved
dredged and fill material from one part of a wetland
adjacent to navigable water to another part of the same
wetland. (NUWF and NUDEP argue that Bowman’s
actions satisfy all of the elements required for a violation
of §§ 301(a) and 404, including addition, and that the
court below erred in granting summary judgment on this
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issue; Bowman argues that NUWF cannot satisfy the
elements of a CWA violation and that the court below was
correct in granting summary judgment on this issue.)
SO ORDERED.
Entered this 14th day of September, 2012.
[NOTE: No decisions decided or documents dated after September
1, 2012 may be cited either in the briefs or in oral argument.]
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
______________________________________
NEW UNION WILDLIFE
)
FEDERATION,
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
NEW UNION DEPARTMENT OF
)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ) C.A. No. 13-1246
Intervenor,
)
v.
)
JIM BOB BOWMAN,
)
Defendant,
)
_______________________________________ )

The New Union Wildlife Federation (“NUWF” or “Plaintiff”)
filed an action under Clean Water Act (CWA) § 505, 33 U.S.C. §
1365 (2006), against Jim Bob Bowman (“Bowman” or
“Defendant”) for filling wetlands without a permit in violation of
§§ 301(a) and 404 of the CWA. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1344. The New
Union Department of Environmental Protection (“NUDEP”)
intervened in this action.
After discovery, Plaintiff and
Defendant filed cross motions for summary judgment. This Court
grants Defendant’s motion on all grounds and denies Plaintiff’s
motion on all grounds.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
Bowman owns one thousand acres of wooded or previously
wooded land adjacent to the Muddy River near the town of
Mudflats in the State of New Union. The Muddy River forms the
border between New Union and Progress at that point and for at
least forty miles both upstream and downstream from Bowman’s
property. The river is more than five-hundred feet wide and more
than six feet deep where it borders Bowman’s property. It is
commonly used for miles both upstream and downstream of this
point for recreational navigation. Bowman’s thousand acres
includes 650 feet of shoreline on the Muddy River. The property
is wholly within the one-hundred year flood plain of the Muddy.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/1

4

2013]

NELMCC COMPETITION PROBLEM

5

Portions of the flood plain and Bowman’s property are inundated
every year when the river is high. Bowman’s property is
hydrologically connected to the Muddy and is covered with trees
and other vegetation characteristic of wetlands. The parties
agree that the property is a wetland, as determined by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers’ (the Corp’s) Wetlands Determination
Manual.
On June 15, 2011, Bowman commenced land clearing
operations. He used bulldozers to knock down trees, level other
vegetation, and push the trees and vegetation into windrows.
Bowman then burned the windrows. Next, he used a bulldozer to
dig trenches and pushed the trees and leveled vegetation remains
and ashes into them. He leveled the resulting field, again
pushing soil from high portions of the field into the trenches and
low lying portions of the field. Finally, he formed a wide ditch or
swale that ran from the back of his property to the river in order to
drain the field into the Muddy. Bowman completed this work on
or about July 15, 2011.
Bowman left a strip of land
approximately 150 feet wide adjacent to the Muddy to clear after
it had drained because it was the most difficult part of the
property to work with the bulldozer, especially when it was
saturated. This strip runs along the 650 foot length of river
frontage on his property.
NUWF is a not for profit corporation organized under the
laws of New Union. Its purpose is to protect the fish and wildlife
of the state by protecting their habitats, among other things. It is
a membership organization funded by members’ dues and
contributions.
Members elect its Board of Directors, the
governing body of the organization, which in turn elects the
officers, including the President.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 1, 2011, shortly after its members became aware of
Bowman’s activities, NUWF sent a notice of its intent to sue
Bowman under § 505 of the CWA, id. § 1365, the citizen suit
provision, to Bowman, EPA, and the State of New Union/NUDEP.
The EPA has properly delegated authority to implement the CWA
to NUDEP. Bowman does not contest the validity of the notice.
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NUDEP contacted Bowman shortly thereafter and sent him a
notice of violation informing him that he had violated both state
and federal law by clearing the field.
Although Bowman
maintained he had not violated state or federal law, he entered
into a settlement agreement with NUDEP, under which he
agreed not to clear more wetlands in the area. He also agreed to
convey to NUDEP a conservation easement on the 150 foot wide
strip of still wooded property adjacent to the Muddy that he had
not yet cleared plus an additional 75 foot buffer zone between
that wooded area and the new field. He agreed to construct and
maintain a year-round wetland on that 75 foot buffer zone. The
conservation easement allows public entry for appropriate, dayuse-only, recreational purposes, requires Bowman to keep the
easement area in its natural state, and forbids him from
developing it in any way other than constructing and maintaining
the artificial wetland. NUDEP and Bowman incorporated their
agreement into an administrative order issued by NUDEP to
Bowman, which Bowman consented to on August 1, 2011. A state
statute virtually identical in relevant parts to §§ 309 (a) and (g) of
the CWA, id. §§ 1319 (a), (g), grants NUDEP authority to issue
such administrative orders. Although the statute authorizes
NUDEP to include an administrative penalty of up to $125,000 in
such orders, NUDEP included no penalty is the order to Bowman.
On August 10, 2011, after issuing the administrative order to
Bowman, NUDEP chose to bring suit in federal court and filed a
complaint against Bowman in this Court under § 505 of the CWA.
See id. § 1365(g) (defining “citizen as “a person or persons having
an interest which may be or is adversely affected”); id. § 1362(5)
(including “State, municipality, commission, or political
subdivision of a State” within the definition of “person”).
On August 30, 2011, NUWF filed its own § 505 complaint
with this Court seeking civil penalties and an order requiring
Bowman to remove the fill material and restore the wetlands. On
September 15, 2012, it filed a motion to intervene in the NUDEP
§ 505 action, to consolidate the NUDEP and NUWF actions, and
an opposition to entry of the decree proposed by NUDEP in the
NUDEP § 505 action. At about the same time, NUDEP filed a
motion to intervene in the NUWF case, which this Court
subsequently granted.
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On September 5, 2011, in its own § 505 case, NUDEP filed a
motion to enter a decree, the terms of which are identical to the
state administrative order. Bowman consented to both the
motion and the decree. This motion is still pending.
Also in September 2011, Bowman observed that the field had
sufficiently drained to plant and sowed it with winter wheat. The
field includes all of his property except the 225 foot wide easement
adjacent to the river.
On November 1, 2011, at a status conference on both cases,
this Court notified the parties that it was not acting on any of the
motions in either the NUDEP or the NUWF cases for the present
besides NUDEP’s motion to intervene in the NUWF case; this
was done without prejudice to NUDEP’s rights to enforce
violations of its proposed decree or of NUWF’s rights to continue
with its cause of action. This Court granted NUDEP’s motion to
intervene in NUWF’s § 505 action, the case which we address
herein.
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.
Jim Bob Bowman filed a motion for summary
judgment on four grounds: 1) NUWF lacks standing because
neither it nor its members suffered an injury in fact fairly
traceable to Bowman’s alleged violations; 2) this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because any violations are wholly
past; 3) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the
State of New Union has already taken an enforcement action and
fully resolved the violations; and 4) this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because a key element of a CWA cause of
action is not satisfied: addition. NUWF filed a motion for
summary judgment on one ground: Bowman violated the CWA
because he added dredge and fill material to navigable waters
from a point source without a § 404 permit. NUDEP joined
Bowman in his motion for summary judgment on the second
(continuing violation) and third (diligent prosecution) issues and
joined NUWF in its motion for summary judgment on the first
(standing) and fourth (CWA violation) issues.
III. STANDING
Under settled law, to have standing to sue, a plaintiff must
prove: (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the
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alleged violations and (3) that is redressable by the court. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). In environmental
cases, injury in fact may be aesthetic rather than economic.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Where an
organization such as NUWF is a plaintiff, it must prove that it
represents individual members who can demonstrate standing.
In support of standing, NUWF submitted affidavits from three of
its members, Dottie Milford, Zeke Norton, and Effie Lawless.
Bowman deposed all three. In summary, the three testified that
they use the Muddy for recreational boating and fishing, often
picnicking on its banks, on or in the vicinity of Bowman’s
property. They testified they are aware that wetlands serve
valuable functions in maintaining the integrity of rivers,
including the Muddy, both acting to absorb sediment and
pollutants and serving as buffers for flooding. Although they
cannot see a difference in the land from the river or its banks,
they are aware of the differences and feel a loss from the
destruction of the wetlands, fearing the Muddy is more polluted
as a result and will be far more polluted if other adjacent
wetlands are cleared and drained for agricultural uses. Milford
testified that the Muddy looks more polluted to her than it did
prior to Bowman’s activities. In addition, Norton testified that he
has frogged the area for years for recreational and subsistence
purposes. The Bowman property had been especially good for
frogging; Norton could always count on getting a dozen good sized
frogs in the right season. Now there are no frogs in the drained
field and he is lucky to find two or three good sized frogs in the
remaining woods and buffer area. Norton admitted on crossexamination at his deposition that the Bowman property was
properly posted under state law against trespassing and he
“supposed he might have been trespassing” when he had gone
frogging there.
These allegations do not constitute an injury in fact fairly
traceable to the clearing of Bowman’s field. The only direct injury
is that one of NUWF’s members can no longer illegally use the
cleared area for frogging. The inability to continue illegal
activities cannot give rise to an injury to support standing.
Moreover, at a deposition, a NUDEP biologist testified that, once
fully-established, the new, year-round, partially-inundated
wetland in the buffer zone will provide richer wetland habitat
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than the former, occasionally-inundated wetland presently
occupied by the field. Indeed, it will provide a higher quality
habitat, and more of it, for frogs.
The remaining alleged injuries are only speculative. Indeed,
considering the richer wetland habitat that will occur in the
buffer zone, the environment may be benefitted rather than
injured by the changes. And, as the three members of NUWF
testified, the conservation easement effectively shields the field
from the river, so that the aesthetics of navigational use of the
river is unaffected.
IV. NO CONTINUING VIOLATION
The Supreme Court held in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), that § 505 of the
CWA requires that alleged violations be continuing or ongoing as
a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. Here Bowman’s land
clearing activities ceased on July 15, 2011 and there is no reason
to believe he will resume them; he has placed the only remaining
land he owns in the area in a conservation easement with
NUDEP. His only subsequent activities have included planting
wheat seeds and draining the property through the drainage
ditch or swale he constructed earlier. Neither activity constitutes
adding dredged spoil or fill to the property, nor do plaintiffs allege
that they constitute such addition. Plaintiffs allege that the
continued presence of dredged and fill material in the former
wetland constitutes a continuing or ongoing violation and some
courts have so held. See Sasser v. Administrator, 990 F.2d 127
(4th Cir. 1993). However, as Jim Bob Bowman testified at
deposition on another matter, “that pig won’t fly.” The idea that
a CWA violation continues unless and until it is undone is
nonsense. That would render without meaning the jurisdictional
requirement for a continuing violation, since all violations would
be continuing. It would also obviate application of the statute of
limitations, for it would never start to run.
Plaintiff responds that while § 404 violations are continuing
unless and until the fill material is removed, § 402 violations,
which Gwaltney addressed, are not. Plaintiff claims § 402
violations are irreversible because once pollutants are discharged
into water they flow away and cannot be removed. That,

9
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however, depends on the facts; many § 402 violations involve the
discharge of solids or sediment which settle on the water bottom
below or shortly downstream from the outfall and can be
removed. Indeed, a number of CERCLA sites involve removal of
bottom sediment from former point sources, notably the Hudson
River PCB site.
Plaintiff’s continuing violation theory is ingenious but cannot
be credited for it would obviate the continuing violation
jurisdictional requirement articulated in § 505 of the CWA and
recognized by the Supreme Court in Gwaltney.
V. PRIOR STATE ACTION
Section 505(b)(1)(B) of the CWA bars a citizen suit if the
“State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil . . .
action in a court of the United States . . . to require compliance . .
.” with the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). Here, NUDEP has
commenced a civil action in a court of the United States. It
diligently prosecuted that action by filing a complaint with this
Court just a month after receiving NUWF’s notice letter and by
negotiating a settlement with Defendant within a month
thereafter.
The settlement, embodied in a consent decree
submitted to this Court for approval, required Bowman to
immediately cease further violations of § 404 and in lieu of a
penalty, to deed a conservation easement over a large portion of
his property, relinquishing its agricultural and development
value, preserving it in a natural state, and opening it to
appropriate public use. The decree also required Bowman to
construct and maintain a year-round, partially-inundated
wetland at considerable initial expense and an indeterminable
future expense. These measures will preserve the viewscape of
the Muddy River and enhance the wetlands environment on the
site. They will allow Mr. Norton to legally frog in an area that
eventually will provide an enhanced environment for frogs. This
Court finds that NUDEP’s actions meet all of the requirements in
the statute to bar NUWF’s suit.
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VI. VIOLATION OF § 404
Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits “the discharge of any
pollutant by any person,” except in compliance with a permit
issued under §§ 402 or 404 of the CWA. Id. § 1311(a). Section
502(12) of the CWA defines “discharge of a pollutant” to mean
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.” Id. § 1362(12). Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the
Corps to issue permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill
materials into the navigable waters.” Id. § 1344. Section 502 of
the CWA defines “pollutant,” navigable waters” and “point
source,” but does not define “addition.” We will first determine if
the three defined elements of the offense are met and then
examine “addition.” Id. § 1362.
A. Pollutant
Section 502(6) defines “pollutant” to mean a list of specific
and general material, the first of which is “dredged spoil,” Id. §
1362(6), uncannily close to the “dredged . . . material” the disposal
of which the Corps is authorized to issue permits for. The CWA
does not define “dredged spoil” or “dredged . . . material.” See 33
U.S.C. § 1362. Dredging, however, is an activity that occurs on
open water to excavate a channel or port docking area to make
them available for commercial navigation. The activity in this
case was moving soil and related material from one part of a field
to another to clear it for agricultural use. Land clearing is not
dredging, so we have no dredged spoil to discharge here. The
CWA’s definition of “pollutant” does not include “fill material.” Of
course, “fill material” may be composed of other pollutants. The
tree and leveled vegetation remains, for instance, are “biological
material,” which is listed as a “pollutant.” Id. No party contests
that the material Bowman moved about the property included
pollutants. This element is satisfied.
B. Point source
Section 502(14) defines “point source” as “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance,” including a list of examples
not including “bulldozer.” Id. § 1362(14). A bulldozer, however, is
a mechanism designed to convey dirt and other material from one
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place to another. Other courts have held that bulldozers are
point sources. See Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh,
715 F.2d 897, 927 (5th Cir. 1983). No party contests that the
bulldozers were point sources. This element is satisfied.
C. Navigable waters
Section 502(7) defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of
the United States,” a singularly unhelpful definition. 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7). Contemplating Bowman’s former woods does not conjure
up the image of navigable waters, supporting waterborne
transportation. Nor does it conjure up the image of the Nation’s
waters. However, the Supreme Court has held that wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters are themselves navigable waters.
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 139
(1985). All the parties agree that the Muddy River is navigable
water; indeed, it supports recreational navigation. All the parties
also agree that Bowman’s former woods met the Corp’s Wetlands
Delineation Manual criteria for wetlands and that the former
woods therefore are wetlands. This element is satisfied.
D. Addition
The CWA does not define “addition.” EPA and the Corps do
not define “addition” in their regulations. EPA has defined
“addition” in various contexts as “from the outside world.” Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Here, Bowman pushed pollutants from one part of his former
woods/wetlands to another part of his former woods/wetlands.
Bowman did not add the pollutants from outside his former
woods/wetlands, thus not meeting EPA’s definition of “addition.”
NUWF protests that EPA developed its “outside world” definition
as a litigation position in § 402 cases and has never applied it to §
404 cases. But the same term used in different parts of the same
statute has the same meaning, unless Congress clearly provides
otherwise. See Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851
(1986). Congress did not provide otherwise in the CWA; it did not
indicate that “addition” means one thing for § 402 and another
thing for § 404. NUWF argues that Congress did so provide, for
applying the “outside world” definition to § 404 would read the
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dredge and fill permit program out of the statute, contrary to
congressional intent. NUWF’s argument is plainly not the case;
the “outside world” definition of “addition” would not read § 404
out of the statute. Under the “outside world” definition, the
dredged spoil or fill material must come from somewhere other
than the wetland into which it is being placed to require a § 404
permit. This is not an unreasonable way to read § 404,
particularly in recognition of its original intent to provide a
permitting scheme for disposal of dredged spoil from dredging
harbors and navigation channels at a considerable distance from
their point or origin. United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co.,
Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (E.D. Mich. 1999). That reading of §
404 may result in a narrower application of its permitting
program, but it would not read the program out of existence.
Alternatively, EPA has interpreted “addition” in its Water
Transfer Rule to incorporate the “unitary navigable waters”
theory, under which all navigable waters are one for the purposes
of § 301(a) of the CWA. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Water Transfer Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697 (June
13, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). Bowman argues that
EPA did so in a regulation, entitling its interpretation to Chevron
deference, as recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in Friends of the
Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District. 570 F.3d
1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is
particularly relevant because petitions for judicial review of that
rule have been consolidated in the Eleventh Circuit. NUWF
argues EPA’s interpretation of “addition” is not entitled to
deference because the rule itself does not define “addition” or
even use the word, and therefore was not an interpretation of the
CWA made in a formal administrative proceeding. See United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2000).
But EPA’s
interpretation of “addition” in the preamble to the proposed and
final rule was the very basis of its rule and was subject to the
public comment that was a part of the rulemaking.
Under EPA’s interpretation, transferring pollutants from one
navigable water to a second navigable water does not add those
pollutants to the second navigable water because the first and
second navigable waters were always one; the pollutants were
always in navigable water and therefore could not be added to the

13
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second navigable water. NUWF answers that EPA stated the
unitary navigable waters theory had “no effect on the § 404
permit program” because the definition of “pollutant” specifically
included “dredged spoil,” and therefore “explicitly forbade
discharges of dredged material except as in compliance” with a §
404 permit. The inclusion of “dredged spoil” in the definition of
“pollutant,” however, explicitly forbids nothing; it only satisfies
one of the four requisite elements. It has nothing to do with
“addition.” NUWF may argue that the unitary theory applies
only to § 402 and not to § 404. But, again, words used in a
statute have the same meaning unless Congress explicitly
provides otherwise and it has not here. See Sorenseon v. Sec’y of
the Treasury of the U.S., 475 U.S. 851 (1986).
Finally, NUWF cites United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331
(4th Cir. 2000), in which the defendant argued that he added
nothing to a wetland when he dug a drainage ditch in a wetland
and sidecast soil removed from the ditch to the adjacent wetland,
since the soil was already in the wetland. The government
argued and the court held that the defendant removed soil from
the ditch but returned dredged spoil to the wetland, adding a
pollutant to the wetland where there had been no pollutant
before. This imaginative piece of verbal metaphysics only masks
reality: nothing is added when a defendant moves soil, no matter
what you call it, a mere few feet within a wetland. And under
EPA’s unitary navigable water theory it doesn’t matter that
defendant moved the soil more than a few feet within the
wetland. Nor does it matter that the defendant’s actions changed
the nature of some of the material from living to dead. See Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.
1988).
To be sure, there are any number of decisions holding that
land clearing activities violate the CWA without a § 404 permit.
None of them, however, analyzed the full ramifications of EPA’s
“outside world” interpretation of “addition,” and none of them
considered EPA’s “unitary navigable waters” theory as it applies
to “addition.” Once these two agency interpretations of “addition”
are considered, it is clear Bowman added nothing to his wetland
when he moved material from one part of field-in-preparation to
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another part of the field-in-preparation. Therefore, this element
is not satisfied.
For the reasons stated above, this Court grants Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on all counts and denies Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment on all counts:
1. Plaintiff lacks standing;
2. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because all
violations are wholly past;
3. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to prior
state action; and
4. There is no violation of the CWA.
SO ORDERED.
Romulus N. Remus
United
States
District
Judge
June 1, 2012
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